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I.  PREFACE: A UTOPIAN SCENARIO FOR PORTABLE HEALTHCARE 
I was on my dream vacation in remote beautiful rural Alaska.  As luck would 
have it, I had barely had time settle into my hotel room in Anchorage for the 
afternoon when the chills and high fever started.  It rang bells from a distant semester 
in college and a rather nasty bout of pneumonia.  My primary care physician 
(“PCP”), like me, had decided to take some of her precious time off and go off 
hiking to Lake Moshannon State Park in rural Pennsylvania; hopes of reaching her 
were bleak.   
It was 4:00 in the afternoon. With my chills under the dubious control of over-
the-counter Naproxen, I bravely walked into to a local library with free Internet 
access for patrons.  With practiced ease, I signed on to a terminal and typed in the 
universal resource locator (“URL”) for the patient portal of my hospital in Cleveland, 
2003-04] ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN E-HEALTHCARE 97 
Ohio – The MetroHealth System (“MHS”).1  This portal would allow me to view the 
relevant parts of my medical record, contact the physician who was handling my 
PCP’s cases in her absence, request an acute care referral to the University of Alaska 
Medical Center (“UAMC”) in Anchorage, with pre-authorization from my insurance 
company.2  I signed on to the portal with my name and was immediately prompted to 
place my thumb on an optical fingerprint scanner attached to the terminal.  An image 
of my thumbprint showed up on the screen - the system had legally validated that it 
was indeed me.  The site then transmitted a Secure Sockets Layer/User 
Authentication (“SSL/UA”) digital certificate to my terminal, which would be my 
passport to use the system for the rest of the session until I signed out.3  Finding the 
supporting physician was easy enough – she was my allergist.  I could tell that she 
was also online.  I wrote a brief message giving her the specifics of my symptoms 
along with my federally mandated electronic signature on the request, which she 
acknowledged.4  I returned to my hotel. 
While I waited, the machinery of a thoroughly modern, national electronic 
healthcare information infrastructure was set in motion.  The physician had been 
connected to MetroHealth from her home in Mentor, Ohio, via MetroHealth’s secure 
remote access services. With an optical fingerprint attachment on her laptop, she 
provided her electronic authentication; she then electronically signed a referral to the 
Acute Care division at UAMC with a request for an appointment on my behalf.  The 
system of course was smarter.  Before dispatching the referral, it retrieved my list of 
insurance carriers.  First, it performed a live eligibility verification query with 
Medical Mutual of Ohio (“MMO”), my health insurance carrier, to ensure that my 
coverage extended to out-of-state acute care services.  To do this, the system used an 
ANSI X12 v4010 (“X12”) 270 Eligibility Inquiry transaction mandated by the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).5  After verification, 
MMO’s records system responded with a return X12 271 Eligibility Response 
transaction.  The MHS system then submitted the entire referral to MMO for pre-
authorization using the X12 278 Health Services Review transaction also mandated 
by HIPAA.6  The insurance counselor who opened the referral request at her terminal 
in Columbus, Ohio, used a two-factor authentication system to electronically sign her 
                                                                
1Copyright © 2004 The MetroHealth System, 2500 MetroHealth Drive, Cleveland, Ohio 
44109-1998. 
2For an example of a typical patient portal solution, see Shared Medical Record for 
Patients, at ¶2 (Copyright © 2004 Epic Systems Corporation), at http://www.epicsystems. 
com/software/mychart.htm, [hereinafter Patient Portal] (describing similar features available 
in Epic’s MyChart© patient portal software). 
3See infra section V.D. 
4See Patient Portal, supra note 2.  See also infra section VII.A.  
5For HIPAA see Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (1996).  For the specific regulations 
regarding standard transactions and code sets, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162 (2002).  ANSI is the 
American National Standards Institute located at http://www.ansi.org.  Technical 
implementation documentation on all ANSI X12 transactions under HIPAA are available 
through the Washington Publishing Company, at http://www.wpc-edi.com/. 
6Id. 
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approval of the referral.7  MMO then transmitted a completed and approved X12 278 
transaction including the pre-authorization data, and all the electronic signatures to 
UAMC, and an acknowledging copy to MHS.  All transactions occurred through 
encrypted connection tunnels over the public internet, secured in accordance with the 
Security provisions of HIPAA (“HIPAA Security Rule”).8  Ten minutes later a care 
management specialist at UAMC was reviewing the request and setting up an 
appointment for my visit. 
Approximately an hour after I returned to my hotel room from the library, the 
phone rang - the concierge informed me that that a UAMC Acute Care transport 
would be arriving to pick me up at 6:30 PM.  By 7:15 PM, I was at UAMC being 
interviewed by a Patient Services Representative (“PSR”).  On the screen in front of 
her she had an open electronic consent form which she asked me to read. She also 
handed me a copy of the UAMC Notice of Privacy Practices (“NPP”).9  I was 
instructed to click a checkbox next to each item on the form if I agreed with the 
provision.  At the end of the last screen of the three-screen form I verified my 
personal information, and placed my signature using a digital signature capture 
device.  The picture of my signature appeared on the screen, but the system had also 
collected and stored handwriting metrics unique to me, thereby authenticating me as 
the true signatory.10  I had thus signed my acknowledgment of the NPP, my consent 
to being treated, and my general consent to the release of relevant care information to 
MMO for billing and claims purposes.  The electronically signed claims and care 
details would be later transmitted by UAMC to MMO using the X12 837 Healthcare 
Claim and X12 275 Additional Information Request and Response with Attachments 
transactions mandate by HIPAA.11
Because I had a suspected infectious condition, the attending physician wanted 
me to stay under observation overnight.  With two clicks of his mouse, a Notice of 
Admission was sent to MMO using another X12 278 transaction which was 
acknowledged using an X12 997 transaction.12  Twenty five minutes later I was in an 
observation bed, the first dose of antibiotic administered, turning the pages of 
Patricia Cornwell’s Blow Fly.13  Outside it had started to snow. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare, like many industries, is fast embracing the benefits of modern 
information technology (“IT”).14  The wide range of available publications on the use 
                                                                
 
7See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2) (Anderson 2002). 
845 C.F.R. § 162.312 (2002). 
9§ 164.520.  
10See infra , note 236, section IX.A. 
1145 C.F.R. § 162.1101 et. seq.  
12Id. 
13PATRICIA CORNWELL, BLOW FLY (Putnam Pub. Group) (2003). 
14A Gartner report indicates that “the U.S. healthcare IT market is forecast to grow at a 
compound annual growth rate of 7.0 percent from $34.1 billion in 2001 to $47.9 billion in 
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of IT in healthcare indicates that IT provides the promise of faster and more 
comprehensive information about all aspects of the healthcare delivery process, to all 
classes of its consumers – patients, doctors, nurses, insurance adjudicators, health 
inspectors, epidemiologists, and biostatisticians.15  But the drive towards electronic 
information in healthcare is not rooted merely in efficiency; more recently, 
significant emphasis has been placed on patient safety issues raised by the Institute 
of Medicine’s (“IOM”) year 2001 quality report on the subject.16  It is believed that 
the deficiencies indicated in that report can be substantially overcome by the use of 
IT in healthcare.17  However, to make this transition successful and complete, all 
aspects of healthcare delivery, information management, and business transactions, 
have to be logically migrated into the electronic world.  This includes the function 
and use of the signature.18   
The use of signatures in business contexts has traditionally provided two 
functions of legal significance: 1) evidence that can attribute documents to a 
particular party, and 2) indication of assent and intent that the documents have legal 
effect.19  In the recent decades, state and federal statutes have substantiated these 
functional attributes to digital or electronic signatures.20  Many of these statutes 
derive from model codes, such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
(“UETA”), that attempt to standardize use and technology surrounding electronic 
                                                           
2006.”  Geraldine Cruz, In Unforgiving Times, the U.S. Healthcare Market Boosts IT 
Spending, 2001-2006, HEALTHCARE DATA & STATISTICS, Gartner, Inc. (2003).  
15For instance, a search on the phrase ‘information technology’ at BioMed Central yields 
publications that pertain to most of these areas.  BioMed Central is an open access publisher 
located at http://www.biomedcentral.com. See also the focus areas and reports at Gartner’s 
Healthcare website located at http://www4.gartner.com/research/focus_areas/asset_48261.jsp. 
16Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st 
Century, National Academy Press (2001).  The study stated that "[i]ndeed, between the health 
care that we now have, and the health care we could have, lies not just a gap, but a chasm.” 
17David W. Bates, The Quality Case for Information Technology in Healthcare, BMC 
MED. INFORMATICS AND DECISION MAKING, 2:7, BioMed Central, Inc. (2002), available at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/7.  In the Discussion section the author notes that 
although many healthcare provider organizations use IT, they are yet to realize the efficiencies 
of similar use in other industries such as airline and parcel services.  Furthermore, healthcare 
has invested at least “50% less of its gross revenues in information technology than other 
information-intensive industries like banking.” 
18James A Menke et al, Computerized Clinical Documentation System in the Pediatric 
Intensive Care Unit, BMC MED. INFORMATICS AND DECISION MAKING, 1:3, BioMed Central, 
Inc. (2001), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/1/3. 
19Peter Brown, The Validity Of Click-Wrap Agreements, 765 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 111, 135 
(2003). 
20See, e.g., Electronic Signature Systems, OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75 (West 2004).  
See also Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(1), 
7001(2) (West 2004), [hereinafter Federal E-Sign Law].  These laws are discussed in greater 
detail in infra Section V.  For the rest of the discussion, digital signature and electronic 
signature are assumed to have the same meaning and used interchangeably. 
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signatures.21  Subsequent sections will attempt to identify gaps in the standards 
which prevent true transaction portability.  Lack of portability defeats one of the 
fundamental goals of healthcare IT solutions – improved efficiency.  The discussion 
will end with a proposal for a uniform federal statutory scheme for standardized 
electronic signatures for healthcare. 
A.  The Functions of Signature in the Healthcare Context 
As in all business practices, in healthcare too, a physical signature provides 
evidence of the signatory’s identity, intent, and consent.22  At common law, 
signatures are used in consents and authorizations,23 orders and acknowledgments,24 
and receipts and validations.25  The existence of this body of law strongly indicates 
that at least in healthcare, written signatures have significant importance in the care 
delivery process.  Hence, as the healthcare industry moves to the electronic 
information age, some thought is necessary to create reliable equivalent processes 
that maintain the functionality of the individual signature.26
B.  Signature Functions at Common Law: Some Modern Case Examples 
In Biddle v. Warren General Hosp., the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with 
the issue of patient consents with regards to disclosure of non-public health 
information to third parties.27  The court held that “in Ohio, an independent tort 
exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic 
medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-
patient relationship.”28  Similarly, in Berger v. Sonneland the Washington Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its recognition of an independent cause of action for the breach of 
                                                                
21See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Drafted by the National Conference Of 
Commissioners On Uniform State Laws (1999), at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/ulc/uecicta/eta1299.htm.  It is of some interest that UETA and Federal E-Sign Law are 
substantially similar, although the latter has evolved around modern concepts of electronic 
identity management.  The associated technology and the inconsistencies of standards are 
further discussed in infra Section V. 
22See Christopher Reed, Legally Binding Electronic Documents: Digital Signatures And 
Authentication, 35 INT’L LAW. 89, 93 (2001). 
23See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1991) (informed 
consent required prior to taking tissue samples from patient); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 
715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (disclosure to a third party without consent is a recognized tort). 
24See Ruefle v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2003 WL 22442063 at *1 (Pa. Sep. 04, 2003) 
(physician FMLA certification form requires physician’s signature). 
25See Sharp v. Lewis Ford, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (form 
acknowledging change of physicians in a Workers’ Compensation claim requires signature). 
26See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, 96-99 (Wiley Computer Publishing) 
(2000). 
27See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518. 
28Id. at 523 
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the physician patient confidentiality under Washington law.29  Of course, underlying 
both Biddle and Berger, is the traditional concept of patient consent documented 
with a written signature on paper.30  The typical signed document is usually kept with 
the patient’s paper medical record in a hospital’s medical records department.31
The common law requirement of the written device has usually resulted in state 
policy. Hence, in Garrett v. Young, a California Court of Appeals refused to find a 
cause of action against the healthcare provider for disclosure of health information to 
her employer because the patient had not provided a written request prohibiting such 
disclosure in accordance with California statutes.32  Garrett is a modern illustration 
of the continued reliance on the requirement of a signed document in healthcare 
delivery agreements.33
 
C.  Statutory Basis For Signatures In Modern Healthcare 
The law’s tradition of written and signed agreements between patients and 
healthcare providers is not the only source for its statutory renditions.  Various 
business aspects of healthcare reflect the traditional use of signatures as evidenced in 
a variety of statutes.34  Indeed, the decisions cited here are also illustrative of state 
statutes in appropriate jurisdictions.35  However, these cases and statutes demonstrate 
                                                                
 
29Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257, 267 (Wash. 2001).  Specifically, the court found that 
petitioner Sonneland's conduct constituted "health care" under Washington statute because he 
had disclosed the confidential information “in his effort to discover more information about 
Respondent's use of pain medications so he could treat, diagnose, or care for [the patient].” 
30See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518; Berger, 26 P.3d at 265. 
31See, e.g., CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 
Functions of the Health Information Management Department, at http://centralstatehospital. 
org/Himd2.htm. 
32Garrett v. Young, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  The court denied the 
cause of action in spite of the evidence that the patient had orally requested nondisclosure.  
The court specifically stated its obligation “to interpret the statute in accordance with its plain 
language and the intent of the Legislature.”  It went on to hold that because the notice had 
been oral it did not comply with the statutory prerequisite of a written notice to nondisclosure. 
33Id. 
34See, e.g., Parental Consent To Performing Abortion Upon Minor, ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 
(2004); Injection card system; protocols, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4065 (West 2002); 
Notice of lack of malpractice insurance, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.143 (West 2004). 
35In Berger, 26 P.3d at 265-66, the Washington Supreme Court substantially relied on 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.030(3) (West 2004), which requires the plaintiff to establish 
that “injury resulted from health care to which the patient or his representative did not 
consent.” (emphasis added).  In contrast, see Garrett, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 142, relies on CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 56.16 (West 2004) whereby a “specific written request by the patient” is required 
to prohibit disclosures to unintended parties.  In Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525, the Ohio Supreme 
Court faced the problem of Legislative silence in distinguishing between the patient-provider 
and attorney-client relationships.  The court placed emphasis on the latter and refused to 
accept defendant’s attempt to use OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.021 (West 2004) to establish 
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a lack of consistency in the structure, approach, and resolution of signature related 
issues in a ubiquitous transactional element of the healthcare delivery process – 
patient consent. 
More recently, federal health privacy and security regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) under HIPAA represent a 
national attempt to establish baseline standards for these types of agreements 
between patients and providers.36  The requirements for written signatures indicating 
agreement persist even under these rules.37  The combination of written signature 
requirements with statutes that give legal effect to electronic signatures, is at the 
foundation of modern electronic transactions.38  In Medical Self Care, Inc. ex rel. 
Development Specialists, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York faced the issue of whether an e-mail 
should be “considered a writing for the purposes of enforcing a ‘written consent’ 
clause of a contract.”39  The court, interpreting federal regulations under the 
Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce (“Federal E-Sign Law”) 
law, held that it should be.40  It is thus relevant to consider the implications of 
electronic transactions in healthcare functions that otherwise require written 
signatures. 
III.  HEALTHCARE IN THE ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AGE 
In 1991, the Health Information Management Systems Society’s (HIMSS) 
Committee on Improving the Patient Record, convened by the Institute of Medicine, 
set a goal to make the computerized patient record a standard technology in 
healthcare by 2001.41  In a recent article, Joyce Sensmeier, Director of Professional 
Services for HIMSS, wrote of a “growing consensus that clinical information 
systems will provide the bridge to advancing the integration of information systems 
in healthcare.”42  Sensmeier concluded that “enabling access to relevant patient 
information from multiple settings and encounters at the point of care will have a 
significant positive impact on the quality, consistency, and timeliness of data and 
                                                           
that the hospital’s attorney firm was not a third party; the patients’ indicated written consents 
therefore did not extend to disclosure to the attorney firm. 
36See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512. 
37Id. 
38See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1306.06 (West 
2004). 
39Medical Self Care, Inc. ex rel. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. NBC Co., Inc., 2003 WL 
1622181 at *6, (S.D.N.Y., Mar 28, 2003). 
40Id. (citing Federal E-Sign Law, §§ 7001(1), 7001(2)). 
41Institute of Medicine, The Computer-based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for 
Healthcare, R. S. Dick and E. B. Steen, eds. National Academy Press (1991). 
42Joyce Sensemeier, Advancing the State of Data Integration in Healthcare, 17 J. 
HEALTHCARE INFO. MGMT. 4, 58 (2003), available at http://www.himss.org/content/ 
files/jhim/17-4/sensmeier.pdf.  
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information.”43  This general trend of increasing reliance on electronic information in 
healthcare is reflected in cases that have begun to emerge in the lower courts 
involving direct healthcare delivery.44  Similar issues have also emerged in allied 
healthcare related businesses.45
A.  Migrating Healthcare Information Management From Paper  
to Electronic Records 
The first suggestions of benefits of the use of electronic records in healthcare 
trace back to the work of Tang.46  Recent efforts to foster migration of the paper 
health record to electronic form have focused on “how the physicians work, and 
develop the software with an eye toward solving real problems.”47  In the opinion of 
some physicians, electronic documentation requirements for healthcare records in the 
United States are more complex and “a coordinated national effort to identify the 
required components of an [electronic medical record system]”48 is necessary. 
In 1997, in a statement before the United States National Committee on Vital and 
Health Statistics (“NCVHS”), the Chair of the Association For Electronic Health 
Care Transactions (“AFEHCT”) emphasized the need for national standardization for 
healthcare transactions.49  The statement was made in support of the proposed 
HIPAA Administrative Simplification legislation.50  It characterized the legislation 
                                                                
 
43Id. at 61. 
44See, e.g., Schmidt v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Wis. 2003) 
(putative class action against the Veterans Administration by employees alleging that the VA 
violated the employees’ rights under the Privacy Act by disclosing their Social Security 
numbers (SSNs) on VA computer system to employees who had no need for the SSNs); 
Detroit Medical Center v. Provider Healthnet Services, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 487, (D. Del. 
2003) (breach of contract action against health information management company seeking 
rescission of asset agreement and service agreement). 
45See Martello v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 795 A.2d 185 (Md. 2002) 
(sole proprietor of medical claims clearinghouse that furnished electronic connectivity services 
brought anti-trust action against larger electronic connectivity provider and insurer that sold 
provider its electronic connectivity business). 
46P.C. Tang et al., Traditional Medical Records As A Source Of Clinical Data In The 
Outpatient Setting, PROC. ANN. SYMP. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN MED. CARE 575 (1994). 
47Jacob Reider, The Electronic Medical Record: Promises and Pitfalls, MEDSCAPE GEN. 
MED. 5(3), at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/460247.   
48Id. 
49Benjamin Curtis, Statement Before The National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics (NCVHS), Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards, and Security (1997), 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970210t5.htm.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k), the 
NCVHS serves as the statutory public advisory body to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services in the area of health data and statistics.  NCVHS is located at http://www.ncvhs.gov. 
50Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA consists of sections 261 through 264.  § 262 amends Title 
XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq., to add a Part C, entitled 
“Administrative Simplification,” with sections 1171-1179, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d 
through § 1320(d)-8 (West Supp. 2002).  Section 261 is a note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(d) and 
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as “an opportunity for the development and use of a uniform implementation process 
of the standards intended for transmitting and receiving electronic data [and] the 
increased availability [and] use of electronic health care transactions.”51  Realization 
of these opportunities depends on a standardized electronic signature.52
B.  Making the Signature an Electronic Process 
To realize the opportunity of standardization for electronic signatures, it is useful 
to revisit the example on consent.53  Peter Brensilver writes that there are significant 
potential benefits of using interactive electronic methodologies in the expression of 
consent.54  Regulatory frameworks have been proposed for electronic informed 
consents.55  However, these proposals mention, but do not successfully address, the 
complexity of the one device that embodies such consent – the electronic signature.56  
Brensilver states that although the “[Federal E-sign Law] further exemplifies the 
acceptance of technology in setting legal standards,”57 to stay within the scope of 
congress’s constitutional authority, the law applies to interstate or foreign 
transactions only.  Efforts to legislate standards for electronic signatures at the state 
level have followed the general guidelines for the Federal E-Sign Law.58  However, 
the approaches have varied significantly enough to make the electronic equivalent of 
the written device less than fully portable.59  As seen in subsequent sections, owing 
to the complexity of methods of electronic identity validation of the signatory, even 
subtle variations in implementation methodologies, while legally indistinguishable in 
their respective jurisdictions, nevertheless, can render the signature non-portable 
across state borders or even systems within a state. 
                                                           
Section 264 is a note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(d)-(2).  Also, Section 263 amends the Public 
Health Service Act, at 42 U.S.C.A. § 242k(k) (West Supp.2002). 
51Curtis, supra note 49. 
52See generally Christian James Helbling, Electronic Records and Signatures in 
Healthcare and the Interplay of E-Sign, HIPAA and UETA, Buchanan Ingersoll (2001), at 
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00323/000777/title/subject/topic/consumer%20law_c
onsumer%20protection/filename/consumerlaw_1_392.   
53See supra Section II. 
54See Peter Brensilver, Note, E-Formed Consent: Evaluating the Interplay of Interactive 
Technology and Informed Consent, 70 GEO WASH. L. REV. 613, 623 (2002). 
55Id. at 630. 
56Id. at 622. 
57Id. at 623. 
5815 U.S.C. §§ 7001(1), 7001(2). 
59See Brensilver, supra note 54, at 630 (citing, as example, two state statutes regarding 
electronic signatures).  But, whereas, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2145(B) (West 2000) tasks 
the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to develop guidelines for permissibility and 
security requirements such as “the use of codes, fingerprints, or other identifying methods,” 
the functionally similar OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2) stipulates that the signatory of 
the signature must be verified by a “biometric” or “two-level” authentication scheme. 
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IV.  THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE 
The goal of this discussion is to propose a uniform electronic signature standard 
through federal law.  We often take for granted this portability as it pertains to a 
written signature.  Seldom do we question whether a signature made on an 
instrument of financial transaction executed in Ohio will remain a valid instrument 
after it is mailed to the state of Louisiana.  For electronic signatures, the core of this 
challenge is the portability of the signature.  Portability of a signature is indeed a 
three-fold feature.  First, from a forensic standpoint, a written signature is a 
biometric element that uniquely identifies its signatory through handwriting.60  
Second, and as a result, its authenticity and its integrity are independently verifiable 
by handwriting experts for the purpose of legal review.61  The two features – 
authentication of the signatory and integrity of the instrument – together guarantee 
that the transaction validated by a signature will be non-repudiable in a legal 
dispute.62  They also establish the intent and consent of the signatory with respect to 
the transaction. 
A.  Recent Historical Perspective On The Problem: The Schnorr Patent 
The use of an electronic medium to replace a written signature poses the 
immediate problem of maintaining the integrity of the written device because no 
longer is the signatory’s biometric information inherent in the device.  Dr. Claus P. 
Schnorr, a resident of Frankfurt, Germany, owns the patent for a "Method for 
Identifying Subscribers and for Generating and Verifying Electronic Signatures in a 
Data Exchange System."63   The patent applies to a method for mutual identification 
of subscribers who are participating in an encrypted data exchange system.64  The 
Schnorr patent demonstrates one problem with the transition of the signature to an 
electronic medium.  Whereas the biometric element of the written signature is a 
human physical characteristic, its technological equivalent here is represented in 
patented intellectual property that is not freely accessible to others!65   
The proprietary aspect of Schnorr’s scheme was the subject of dispute in Cylink 
Corp. v. Schnorr which upheld Schnorr’s rights to the patented algorithm.66  Dr. 
Schnorr licensed his patent to Public Key Partnership ("PKP"), a partnership formed 
by Caro-Kann, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cylink, and RSA Data Security, Inc. 
(“RSA”).67  Although PKP was eventually dissolved and its license agreement with 
                                                                
60Alan E. Brill, The Technologies Of Privacy And Privacy Invasion: An Introduction, 748 
PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 85, 109 (2003). 
61See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that “handwriting 
comparison testimony has a long history of admissibility in the courts of this country”). 
62See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
63U.S. Patent No. 4,995,082 (issued Feb. 19, 1991). 
64Id. 
65See Brill, supra note 60. 
66Cylink Corp. v. Schnorr, 939 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.D.C. 1996).   
67Id.at 40. 
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Dr. Schnorr terminated, during the months prior to the dissolution, Cylink and RSA 
competed for an exclusive licensing agreement with Dr. Schnorr, in which RSA 
prevailed and was appointed as the exclusive representative to license and enforce 
the Schnorr patent.68  Following an RSA press-release Cylink's in-house counsel 
proposed that Cylink would represent Dr. Schnorr's patent better than RSA but was 
informed that the agreement with RSA was exclusive and that RSA would enforce 
the patent.69  It was suggested that Cylink apply to RSA to obtain a license for the 
Schnorr patent.70  Instead, Cylink filed a petition for a judgment declaring that its use 
of a particular digital signature algorithm did not infringe the patent.71  Eventually 
Schnorr’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted thereby upholding his patent 
rights.72
The impact of the Cylink decision has rippled through the IT community.  It has 
even thwarted the federal government’s efforts at creating electronic signatory 
authentication standards under the Federal Information Processing Standard 
(“FIPS”).73  The FIPS 186 Digital Signature Standard (“DSS”), was issued in May 
1994, under which the Digital Signature Algorithm (“DSA”) proposed a standard for 
authentication, including integrity.74  However, prior to the adoption of the standard, 
the U.S. government filed a patent application on DSA in an attempt to exercise 
exclusive control on the standard and its evolution, avoid variants in the industry, 
and subsequently license the patent to future implementers of DSA, thereby 
strengthening the standard itself.75  The move was successfully opposed by Schnorr 
who claimed that DSA could not be practiced without infringing his digital signature 
patent.76  While the Federal government has continued to make efforts at creating a 
standard, there has not been any significant legislative backing for implementation of 
such standards, and even less so in electronic healthcare.77
                                                                
68Id. 
69Id. of 41 
70Id. 
71Id.  Cylink was subsequently invited by RSA to either enter negotiations for a license to 
the Schnorr Patent or cease marketing and selling products that incorporated Schnorr’s 
algorithm. 
72Id. at 42. 
73See Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues In Cryptography, 13 NO. 5 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 
(1996).  In reviewing the evolution of cryptography in digital signatures, the author outlines 
efforts under FIPS that were challenged by Schnorr.  FIPS publications can be found at 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/. 
74Id. at 11 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id.  See also HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.304, which uses a very non-specific 
definition of authentication as “the corroboration that a person is the one claimed.” 
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B.  Avoiding Risks Associated With Electronic Data:  Encryption and Access Control 
Aside from portability there remains a continuing need for a standard similar to 
the FIPS proposals, because the lack of standards introduces significant security risks 
in electronic data exchange.78  In practice, this means that signature and transaction 
data needs protection from improper visibility and unauthorized access.  The 
vulnerability of unprotected data is highlighted in Cobell v. Norton.79  In the April 
2001 issue of The Government Executive magazine, Dominic Nessi, the Chief 
Information Officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") observed that BIA had 
“no security . . . [and] no infrastructure…[and the] entire network . . . [could] be 
breached by a high school kid.”80  The plaintiffs had already sought a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) aimed at preventing destruction of Indian trust funds and 
records, which had been granted.81  
Following Nessi’s declaration, Cobell and others brought a second suit against 
the Secretary of the Department of Interior (“DOI”), seeking among other things, an 
emergency temporary restraining order to prevent further destruction of data in 
BIA’s systems in violation of the first TRO.82  A court assigned Special Master 
began an investigation of the DOI’s IT systems and produced a report.83  The report 
highlighted that the DOI had breached its duty to ensure the integrity of the data in 
its care, and had failed to comply with several federal regulations.84 Furthermore, its 
failure was evident in the “enormity of the dangers to which this trust information 
[was] being exposed.”85   
Cobell’s issues are applicable to healthcare information and transactions.  
Elements of electronic signatures such as the signature code, signatory’s identity, 
tokens, and so on, are all pieces of electronic information that are necessarily stored 
somewhere.  If they are openly visible or otherwise retrievable without the 
signatory’s permission or knowledge, then the very identity of the signatory as well 
                                                                
78See Radlo, supra note 73. 
79Cobell v. Norton, 2001 WL 1555296, D.D.C. (Dec 6, 2001).  
80Id. at *1 (citing Katherine McIntire Peters, Trail of Troubles, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 
April 1, 2001 at 100). 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Id. at *6 (citing The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (making 
uniform federal information resources management policies and practices as a means to 
improve the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs); The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (criminalizing 
unauthorized access to electronic communications); The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 
1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (criminalizing unauthorized access to information stored on 
government computer systems); The Computer Security Act of 1987 40 U.S.C. § 1441 
(requiring the government to promulgate standards for computer security, train relevant 
employees in computer security and establish plans for the security and privacy of computer 
information)). 
85Id. at *6. 
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as the signature’s integrity may be compromised.  It is therefore necessary to both 
secure as well as validate electronic signatures and transaction contents.  Technology 
has answered this challenge with cryptographic techniques of hiding information 
content, commonly referred to as encryption, which renders data unintelligible by 
altering it in an ordered fashion.86  In the healthcare context, the federal government 
has attempted to respond to such technology by prescribing encryption requirements 
for healthcare under the HIPAA Security Rule.87   
The preamble to the rules, in pertinent part, acknowledges the “financial and 
technical burdens associated with the employment of encryption tools” in the context 
of “small and rural providers.”88  This degree of hesitance and flexibility in the rule 
is reflective of the unsettled nature of the law in a rapidly evolving technical field.  
Arguably, although encryption is an addressable standard, the addressability may be 
narrowed based on a healthcare facility’s size, location, accessibility to resources, 
and so on.89  Additionally, the preamble encourages “[healthcare facilities] . . . to 
consider use of encryption technology for transmitting electronic protected health 
information, particularly over the internet.”90  Understanding the interplay between 
electronic signatures as electronic data, and the integrity and security of the 
transactions they bind to, requires a scrutiny of the interaction of current signature 
technology, the law, and federal and state technology policy. 
V.  ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE TECHNOLOGY, CURRENT LAW, AND POLICY 
A.  Legal Requirements for Electronic Signatures 
Any proposed generalized electronic signature scheme should address three 
principle aspects of the signature - its structure, its signatory, and the integrity of the 
transaction it binds to.91  Laws and governmental publications in the past decade lend 
clues as to the specifications of each of these aspects and we start there. 
The structure of the signature is typically found in the definitions of the 
electronic signature itself.  For instance, the Federal E-Sign Law defines electronic 
signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically 
                                                                
86Cryptography and encryption are discussed further in supra section V.B. 
87See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (requiring a covered entity to “[i]mplement a 
mechanism to encrypt electronic protected health information whenever deemed 
appropriate.”); See also § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (addressable implementation of “a mechanism to 
encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health information.”).  “[A]ddressable” and 
“required” specifications are explained at § 164.306(d)(1). 
88See 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8357 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, and 
164). 
89Id. at 8336 (discussing “addressable” standards as those where a covered entity “will 
ultimately do one of the following: (a) Implement one or more of the addressable 
implementation specifications; (b) implement one or more alternative security measures; (c) 
implement a combination of both; or (d) not implement either an addressable implementation 
specification or an alternative security measure.”) 
90Id. at 8357. 
91See 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000). 
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associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with 
the intent to sign the record.”92  The UETA adopts the identical definition.93   
In contrast, the Ohio Electronic Signature Systems statute for healthcare defines 
the electronic signature as:  
[A]ny of the following attached to or associated with an electronic record 
by an individual to authenticate the record:  
(a) A code consisting of a combination of letters, numbers, characters, or 
symbols that is adopted or executed by an individual as that individual's 
electronic signature;  
(b) A computer-generated signature code created for an individual;  
(c) An electronic image of an individual's handwritten signature created 
by using a pen computer.94
Finally, the proposed electronic signature rule under HIPAA (“proposed HIPAA 
rule”) takes a broad and generalized approach.95  It specifies, in relevant part, that 
“[a]n electronic signature is the attribute affixed to an electronic document to bind it 
to a particular entity.”96
Intuitively, integrity of a signature applies to both the content of a transaction as 
also to the signatory’s consent and intent with respect to that content as she 
understands it to be at the time of the signing.  Abstract expression of consent and 
intent is inherently difficult to capture in electronic form.  Hence, in situations where 
the law would require a signature in writing, a consumer’s understanding and 
consent must be assured when asked to use an electronic signature instead.97  In this 
regard, the Federal E-Sign Law goes farthest by stipulating various assurances that 
need to be provided to the consumer prior to the expression of their assent to the 
transaction, when an electronic signature is used for a transaction that would 
otherwise require a written signature.98  In contrast, the Ohio signature law requires 
only that there be “a process to verify that the individual affixing the electronic 
signature has reviewed the contents of the entry and determined that the entry 
                                                                
92§ 7006(5). 
93Uniform Electronic Transaction Act § 2(8).   
94See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3701.75(A)(2) (West 2004). 
95See Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241, 43269 (Oct. 12, 
1998) (proposed rule to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 142). 
96Id. 
97See Radlo, supra note 73, at 1. 
9815 U.S.C.A § 7001(C) specifies a gamut of protected consumer rights.  Specifically, 
§ 7001(C)(1) outlines those specific rights that must be guaranteed for an electronic signature 
to satisfy the requirement of a written signature including intent of the signatory as well has 
her understanding of the process and the implications of the electronic signature and 
transaction. 
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contains what that individual intended.”99  The proposed HIPAA rule requires that 
there be a “logical manifestation of signature” and that there exist “additional 
information such as time stamp and signature purpose specific to that user.”100
While the structure of the signature may be statutorily defined and the intent of 
the signatory embedded in appropriate language contained in the transaction itself, 
defining and authenticating the signatory’s electronic identity poses a significant 
technological challenge.101  Approaches to authentication of the signatory’s identity 
can vary.  The proposed HIPAA rule integrates a general authentication requirement 
of the signatory’s identity into the structure by adding to the definition that the 
signature must “[secure] the user authentication (proof of claimed identity) at the 
time the signature is generated.”102  The Ohio statute in contrast is highly specific 
with respect to the technology to be used for authenticating the signatory by 
requiring that an electronic signature system utilize “either a two-level access control 
mechanism that assigns a unique identifier to each user or a biometric access control 
device.”103  Other state statutes take varying approaches.104
It should be also noted that identity, authentication, and consent and intent are 
meaningful only to the extent that their integrity and security are maintained 
throughout the entire transaction.  This might include electronic transmission of the 
content and the signature.  In healthcare, existing privacy and security requirements 
pertaining to Protected Health Information (“PHI”) therefore apply to all 
transactional content.105  They would also apply for the entirety of the transmission 
of such content.106  The unification of these concepts into the electronic signature 
structure is at the core of the electronic signature and we turn to it next. 
B.  Analyzing Portability: Identification, Authentication and Intent - Cryptography 
and Public Key Encryption 
The proposed HIPAA signature rule emphasizes that the signature should 
“[ensure] the integrity of the signed document to enable transportability of data, 
interoperability, independent verifiability, and continuity of signature capability.”107  
The simplicity of this statutory requirement belies the enormous complexity of the 
science necessary to address it – cryptography.108
                                                                
99Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.75(B)(4). 
10063 Fed. Reg. at 43,273. 
101See generally SCHNEIER, supra note 26. 
102Id. 
103See § 3701.75(B)(2). 
104See statutes listed in infra section VI.A and notes therein. 
105See 45 C.F.R. §164.501 
106See 63 Fed. Reg. at 43, 265-69. 
107Id. at 43, 274. 
108For an exhaustive review, see SCHNEIER, supra note 26. 
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Traditional cryptography is a three-step process.  First, plaintext transactional 
content is encoded using: (a) a general mathematical scheme (also known as an 
algorithm), and (b) a signatory-specific key (also known as a cipher).109  The 
unintelligible, encoded data content (also known as ciphertext) can be deciphered 
only by the key-holder; as long as the cipher is sufficiently robust, and the signatory 
and recipients are the sole proprietors of the keys, the integrity of the transaction is 
assured.110  Next, a message authentication code (“MAC”), mathematically derived 
from attributes of the original message content, is added to the encrypted 
transaction.111  The MAC ensures that “the [transaction] came from the person it 
purports to have come from (authentication), and that the [content] was not altered in 
transit (integrity).”112  The last step is to add the digital signature, which itself is a 
code that is computed from: (a) the encrypted message, and (b) unique information 
in a signatory’s key. 113  The digital signature is then attached to the encrypted 
transaction to indicate both authorship as well as consent.114
To ensure proper functionality, modern digital cryptography uses the Public Key 
Encryption (“PKE”) system.115  The system uses an asymmetric scheme with a pair 
of keys per signatory – a public key and a private key.116  The public key is the 
encryption key and is shared with recipients.  It is used by a recipient to validate the 
signatory’s digital signature and by a sender to encrypt a transaction intended for the 
key’s owner.117  In contrast, the private key is used by the signatory to generate her 
digital signature for a transaction to a recipient and by a recipient to decrypt 
transactions encrypted with her public key.118  Public keys are therefore shared by 
parties to be trusted in a transaction and fraudulent duplication of keys is avoided 
because a private key cannot be used to generate a public key and vice versa.119
Functionally, assume A and B have exchanged public keys as trusted parties to a 
transaction.  A uses B’s public key plus original transaction content to encrypt the 
transaction to be sent to B.120  She then uses her private key plus elements of the 
encrypted data to generate her digital signature to be attached to the transaction.  She 
then dispatches the transaction to B.  B uses A’s public key to (a) verify the 
authenticity of A’s digital signature and, (b) to encrypt an acknowledgment of receipt 
                                                                
109Id. at 88-89. 
110Id. 
111Id. 
112SCHNEIER, supra note 26, at 92-93. 
113Id. 
114Id. at 97. 
115Id. at 95. 
116Id. 
117Id. 
118Id. 
119SCHNEIER, supra note 26, at 95. 
120Id. 
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to be sent back to A.  He then uses his private key to decrypt the transaction received 
from A.  It is possible that C, who is not a trusted party to the transaction, could 
receive the transaction in error or by interception.  But C has neither A’s nor B’s 
public or private keys and therefore can neither verify A’s signature nor decrypt the 
content.  Also, he cannot duplicate B’s signature to create a notification of receipt in 
B’s name, which A is expecting. 
There are several classes of algorithms that are available for both content 
encryption and digital signature generation.121  The algorithms may be proprietary, 
public, or classified; they could also have different cipher strengths.122  Furthermore, 
the complexity of the system poses inherent hurdles, such as determination of the 
true identity of the signatory and the distribution, compatibility, and reliability of 
keys.123  Since the advent of PKE, technology has attempted to create an electronic 
trust infrastructure to facilitate commerce in electronic form.  The most popular and 
comprehensive of such efforts is the Public Key Infrastructure. 
C.  Creating an Infrastructure for Electronic Trust: The Public Key Infrastructure 
A Public Key Infrastructure (“PKI”) is a system of key generation and 
management that relies on trusted third parties to verify identity of key-owners and 
signatories.124  Third-party organizations issue “certificates” to signatories that “list a 
public key and confirm that the person identified in the certificate holds the 
corresponding private key.”125  These organizations are known as Certificate 
Authorities (“CA”).126  They also manage proper pairing of public and private keys, 
verify the date and time of signatures and transactions, and maintain lists of keys that 
become compromised, unreliable or otherwise invalid.127
Of course, even PKI cannot function for the purpose of standardized transactions 
in healthcare, or elsewhere, if the keys managed are not themselves standardized.  
The Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) has made the most notable attempt to 
create a standard for PKI keys.128  The PKIX Working Group of the IETF was 
                                                                
 
121Id. at 89-93. 
122Id. 
123Id. at 96.  See also Reed, supra note 22, at 95-97. 
124See Rebecca Porter, Do Electronic Signatures Mean An End To The Dotted Line?, 39-
SEP TRIAL 52, 56 (2003). 
125See Sun Microsystems, Inc. X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 
(Sun Microsystems 2001), [hereinafter X.509 Certificates], at http://java.sun.com/ 
products/jdk/ 1.2/docs/guide/security/cert3.html (describing a Certificate as a “digitally signed 
statement from one entity, saying that the public key (and some other information) of another 
entity has some specific value”).  
126Porter, supra note 124. 
127Id. 
128See Overview of the IETF, at http://www.ietf.org/overview.html.  The website describes 
IETF as “a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and 
researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation 
of the Internet. It is open to any interested individual.”  It goes on to state that the individual 
working groups do the technical work.  These groups are organized by topic into areas such as 
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established in 1995 to develop Internet standards to extend the X.509 key-certificate 
standard to support PKI.129  The group’s proposals created an extensive set of 
standards for various aspects of X.509 certificate management, distribution, 
revocation and properties, some of which are based on existing technology.130  Most 
significantly, the proposed standard provides the first realistic chance of a functional 
PKI where key compatibility is not an impediment.  Additionally, it also allows 
special attributes certificates to store biometric templates as a part of the 
authentication key.131  Finally, in addition to third party CAs, products from key 
identity management vendors allow any organization to act as its own CA.132  Both 
PKI, as well as these products, represent major industry acceptance of the current 
version of the X.509 standard.133
There is however a gap that remains between the available technology and the 
acceptability of the standard.  Since the X.509 proposal is largely a recommendation, 
there has been general reluctance to an industry wide adaptation.  The lack of a clear 
legal mandate for a standardization of this important transactional element remains 
the main contention that continues to thwart portability of electronic signatures. 
D.  Authenticating the Signatory’s Identity:  Non-Repudiation 
A signatory authentication system could be single factor system such as a 
password.134  However, the traditional password-only systems are plagued with 
security problems that increase the risk of fraud: keystroke monitoring (a Trojan 
program that stealthily monitors keystrokes to collect passwords), social engineering 
(obtaining passwords using social situational tactics or spying), man-in-the-middle 
attacks (computers pretending to be the service that a client signatory is trying to 
reach, accepting the client’s password and other identity information, and then using 
the supplied identity to authenticate on to the real service), network monitoring 
(sniffing for passwords being transmitted on an entire data network), password 
                                                           
routing, transport, and security.  An Internet Architecture Board (“IAB”) provides 
architectural oversight and adjudicates appeals on complaints.  
129See IETF, Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix) (2003), [hereinafter IETF PKIX], at 
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html; see also X.509 Certificates, supra note 
125 (What’s Inside an X.509 Certificate?). 
130See IETF PKIX, supra note 129. 
131See Proposed Methods to use X.509 Attribute Certificates to store biometric templates, 
hereinafter X.509 Attribute Certificates, THE BIOMETRIC CONSORTIUM, at http://www. 
biometrics.org/html/x.509.html. 
132See e.g. RSA Keon® Certificate Authority, RSA SECURITY, INC. (2003), at 
http://www.rsasecurity.com/products/keon/certificateauth.html. 
133See RSA Keon® Certificate Authority: Technical Specifications, Certificate Standards, 
RSA SECURITY, INC. (2003), available at http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1226. 
134In any authentication system, the “factor” refers to that quality of the identification 
process that is unique to the user.  In its simplest form, a unique factor would be something 
that, presumably, only the signatory knows – a secret code or password.  
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cracking (the “brute force” approach), key-under-the-mat problems (passwords 
written on Post-It™ notes), and so on.135  
There are modern, and stronger, single factor systems that use biometric 
techniques. Biometric authentication automatically recognizes persons based on 
some physiological or behavioral characteristics that are universal, distinct, 
permanent, and collectible.136  These characteristics include fingerprint, face, hand 
geometry, iris, and voice.137  However, these techniques suffer from certain 
drawbacks such as false rejection errors, sensitivity to the environment, user-
squeamishness or inconvenience, and cost.138  Additionally, in healthcare, while 
biometric methods are used for workforce authentication, they may be unsuitable for 
patients where a health or physiological condition could itself compromise the 
efficacy of a chosen biometric characteristic.139  Biometrics is nevertheless a viable 
option because characteristics that are inherent to a person are both unique and 
generally available.140
An enhancement to the single-factor system is to use a two-factor system which 
authenticates a signatory using two distinctive factors – something she has and 
                                                                
135See Rainbow Technologies, Inc., Two-Factor Authentication – Making Sense of all the 
Options, ITSECURITY.COM: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SECURITY (Townsend & 
Taphouse Feb. 12 (2002), [hereinafter Rainbow Two-Factor], at http://www.itsecurity.com/ 
papers/rainbow2.htm. 
136S. Prabhakar et al., Biometric Recognition: Security & Privacy Concerns, IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY MAGAZINE, VOL. 1, NO. 2 33 (Mar.-Apr. 2003), also available at 
http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/j2033.pdf. 
137Id. at 36. 
138Id. at 35-36. 
139For instance, an iris-scan on a patient with an eye-infection.  See Ultra-Scan’s Livescan 
Ultrasonic Identification System Achieves Extremely High Results in Independent Lab Tests, 
FINDBIOMETRICS.COM (published by TopickZ Inc.), Jan. 23, 2003, at ¶7, at 
http://www.findbiometrics.com/Pages/news_releases/news295.html, [hereinafter Ultra-Scan] 
(stating that conventional optical finger printing technology can “fail to read and enroll 
significant portions of the population, for example, older people, people with dry skin, people 
with petite fingers or fine ridge structures, often Asian women and children, and some people 
with dark skin”).  See also Vance C. Bjorn, An Introduction To Privacy And Security 
Considerations of Biometrics Technology, 701 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 105, 107 (2002) (stating 
that biometrics have “long been used in law enforcement and government applications,” and 
enumerating applications in access control).  But see also David A. Petti, An Argument for the 
Implementation of a Biometric Authentication System (“BAS”), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 703, 703 (1998) (indicating that “widespread regulation of biometrics remains 
uncharted territory in the legal framework of the United States”). 
140See discussion in supra section IV.A (comparing the biometric qualities of a handwritten 
signature which is unique to the signatory and generally available, with algorithmic techniques 
such as the Schnorr method, which is patented and not generally available).  See also Edward 
P. Richards, Phenotype v. Genotype: Why Identical Twins Have Different Fingerprints, in 
Identification Evidence at ¶1 (Forensic-Evidence.com 2004), available at 
http://www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID_Twins.html (illustrating why fingerprints may 
be key evidentiary distinction between identical twins who are genetically virtually 
indistinguishable). 
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something she knows - thereby reducing the risk of fraud.141  The second factor 
continues to be the same as single-factor systems; for example, it can be a code or 
password.  The first factor is typically a physical possession such as a key, a card, a 
token, and so on.  The reduced risk of fraud reduces the need for a biometric factor 
and avoids the associated problems.142  Two-factor systems themselves come in 
several flavors including code generation tokens, smart cards, and smart tokens.143  
These devices have varying degrees of reliability and security, but they are 
susceptible to loss, destruction and malfunction.144
VI.  REGULATORY EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION 
Section V.A introduced some statutory and regulatory schemes for electronic 
signatures.  It also pointed out that these constructions were not specific with regards 
to the technology behind the signature.  One might draw an analogy with the United 
States Postal Services and other carrier systems such as UPS and FedEx.  We rarely 
wonder why in spite of these being different carrier systems the general delivery of 
letters, parcels, etc. does not run into the types of problems encountered by electronic 
transactions.  More specifically, while a pathology specimen gets efficiently 
delivered from a clinic to a laboratory by the local courier who obtains a delivery 
signature on paper, the electronic transaction involved in sending the pathology 
report digitally from the laboratory to the clinic runs amuck with difficulties of 
identification, authentication, privacy, and electronic signatures.  It would seem that 
regulatory schemes that impose electronic transaction standards without delineating 
any technology can complicate rather than facilitate the portability of transactions. 
A.  Electronic Signatures in  State Statutes 
Most states have enacted the UETA.145  Additionally a few states have enacted 
electronic signature laws specifically for healthcare.146  There are two categories of 
                                                                
141See Rainbow Two-Factor, supra note 135.  The author illustrates a common example of 
an automated teller machine (ATM) card and a personal identification number (PIN).  
Together, they represent a form of two-factor authentication. Individually each is useless to a 
prospective identity thief. Only when used together can an identity be confirmed and access 
granted. 
142Id. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1633.2 (West 2003); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-
71.3-102 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-267 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 
§ 12A-102 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4901 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 668.002 (West 
2003); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/5-130 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW, 
§ 21-101 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.832 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12A:12-2 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1306.01 (West 2004); TEX. BUS. & COMM. 
CODE ANN. § 43.001 (Vernon 2004). 
146See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
19a-25a (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-9-
64 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01.2 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75 
(West 2004).  
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problems that persist in such statutory schemes.  First, the UETA, although 
consistent in terminology, is not sufficiently specific in requirements.147  Neither is it 
clear on methods of implementation to be followed.  For instance, section 9 of the 
UETA states: 
(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person 
if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any 
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure 
applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or 
electronic signature was attributable.  
(b) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a 
person under subsection (a) is determined from the context and 
surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or 
adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as 
provided by law. 148 (emphasis added) 
Particularly in the area of requirements, this definition creates an obstacle for the 
enacted law to be useful as a standard.  “Surrounding circumstances” is not defined.  
Nor is there specification of what elements of the circumstances can be considered as 
representing “agreement.”149  The UETA’s definition of “security procedure” also 
poses similar problems:  
[A] procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic 
signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for 
detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record.  The 
term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other 
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other 
acknowledgment procedures. 150 (emphasis added) 
Here, the phrase “is that of a specific person” in itself embodies a wide range of 
methods to authenticate persons.151
To further complicate matters, healthcare-specific electronic signature statutes 
vary in both specificity and consistency.152  They also suffer from lack of clarity.  For 
example, the term “two-level access control” under the Ohio law is ambiguous under 
industry terminology.153  It could mean a two-factor system described previously.154  
                                                                
147See, e.g., UETA §§ 2(8), 2(10), 2(14), 2(16), at 4-5. 
148§ 9(b). 
149Id. 
150§ 2(14). 
151See supra section V.D. 
152Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149(g) (requiring signatory 
authentication by “electronic signature keys”) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75(B)(2) 
(requiring authentication by a “biometric or two-level access control”). 
153See § 3701.75(B)(2). 
154See supra section V.D. 
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But it could also refer to two sets of credentials in a credential hierarchy system.155  
In such a system, the signatory’s access to the electronic signature system itself 
would be conditioned on her credentials existing at two different logical levels in a 
multi-level hierarchy.156  However, the focus of the latter approach has more to do 
with managing access control (what systems and functions a person has access to), 
rather than authentication (whether the person indeed is who she is claiming to be).  
It is relevant to note that while authentication is a prerequisite for access control, the 
driving factor behind authentication in this discussion is the establishment of the 
signatory’s identity. 
In healthcare, such inconsistencies in specifications and implementation would 
prevent an electronic transaction from crossing a state border with predictable legal 
effect.  The PKI used in one state might incorporate keys that are not recognizable by 
the PKI used in another state.  There may be inconsistent distribution mechanisms of 
keys.  The authentication technique used or implemented in one state may not be the 
same and hence not verifiable in another state.  Finally, even if the information were 
logically portable, the inconsistency in legal effect would throw valid consent in one 
state into jeopardy in another. 
B.  State Agencies: The Ohio State Pharmacy Board & “Positive Identification” 
In Ohio, the State Pharmacy Board (“OSPB”) is responsible for administering 
and enforcing laws governing the legal distribution of drugs.157  The enforcement 
role in the administration of dangerous drugs has inevitably lead OSPB to address 
issues surrounding modern electronic methods of drug dispensation and 
recordkeeping.  OPSB’s recent rules under the Ohio Administrative Code specify 
minimum requirements that must be met before a computerized alternative to the 
traditional paper systems can be used for pharmacy purposes, including data content, 
refill history, validation, print capabilities, and association of each prescription with 
relevant patient profiles.158  Specifically, OSPB’s rules focus on three inter-related 
areas of electronic transactions that are functionally analogous to an electronic 
signature – authentication, standardization and integrity.159
First, with respect to authentication, the rules mandate the requirement of 
“positive identification” (“PID”) of individuals in all electronic pharmacy systems.160  
PID is defined as: 
                                                                
155See Elisa Bertino, Maχ: An Access Control System for Digital Libraries and the Web, 
PROC. OF THE 26TH INT’L COMP. SOFTWARE AND APPLICATIONS CONF. 945, 947 (IEEE 2002), 
at http://semioweb.msh-paris.fr/euforbia/download/max.pdf.  
156Id. 
157See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.25, 4729.26 (West 2004); see generally OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE § 4729 (2003). 
158See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-28 (2004). 
159General information about OSPB can be found at http://pharmacy.ohio.gov/.  
160OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-01(N). 
118 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 18:95 
[A] method of identifying an individual who prescribes, administers, or 
dispenses a dangerous drug. Such method must include a physical means 
of identification such as, but not limited to, the following: 
(1) A manual signature on a hard-copy record; 
(2) A magnetic card reader; 
(3) A bar code reader; 
(4) A thumbprint reader or other biometric method; or 
(5) A daily printout of every transaction that is verified and manually 
signed within twenty-four hours by the individual who prescribed, 
administered, or dispensed the dangerous drug. The printout must be 
maintained for three years and made available on request to those 
individuals authorized by law to review such records. 
A magnetic card reader or a bar code reader system of identification must 
also include a private personal identifier, such as a password, for entry 
into a mechanical or automated system.161
The definition incorporates both technical and procedural specifications for an 
authentication mechanism applicable to electronic signatures.  For the purpose of this 
discussion PID appears to be a fairly comprehensive definition for a number of 
reasons.  It statutorily incorporates the transition between the written and electronic 
signatures.162  It also incorporates an enumerated version of the authentication 
provisions of the Ohio Revised Code §3701.75(B)(2), discussed in section V.A.163  
Finally, it addresses the security concerns of electronic systems, discussed in section 
IV.B, by incorporating procedural controls for record of authorization of transactions 
in each 24-hour period, and maintenance of these records for review.164  
Second, in the area of standardization OSPB acknowledges the variety of 
methods available for transmission of electronic prescriptions – “[s]ome of the 
systems are office-based, some are web-based, and some use a switching station to 
route the prescription to the pharmacy directly from [a prescriber’s] computer to a 
pharmacy computer or facsimile machine.”165  To ensure compliance, OSPB requires 
                                                                
161Id.  
162Id. at (1). 
163The provision of “two-level access control” under §3701.75(B)(2) is incorporated by 
combining § 5-01(N)(2) or § 5-01(N)(3) at ¶1, with ¶2. 
164§ 4729-5-01(N)(5). 
165See Electronic Prescription Transmission Systems, [hereinafter EPTS], State Board of 
Pharmacy (Feb. 4, 2004), at http://pharmacy.ohio.gov/ElectronicRx-040204.htm (describing 
electronic prescription systems as those that allow prescriptions to be sent electronically from 
a prescriber to a pharmacy). 
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that electronic prescription systems intended for use in Ohio must obtain prior 
approval from OSPB.166  The approval includes a review of each system to ensure 
that “true [PID] of the prescriber sending the prescription” has been achieved under 
the statute.167
Finally, with respect to integrity of the PID, OSPB notes that a mere pictographic 
representation of a signature visible on a printed version of the transmission does not 
meet PID requirements.168  Instead the procedural verification requirement, aimed at 
non-repudiation of the transaction signatory, uses a written signature on a daily 
printout of signed actions.169  However, this unfortunate reliance on printed output in 
the standard hinders portability for the purpose of electronic signatures.  The 
validation is only available to the sender and not the recipient of the transaction.  The 
result yields a transaction of reduced trust because a key assurance with respect to 
the trust – the authentication and integrity of the signature – does not electronically 
travel with the transaction.  Indeed, the lack of portability and, the concomitant lack 
of trust in the transaction, are evident in certain aspects of OSPB’s use of electronic 
prescription systems.170
Two further observations can be made about the PID approach in the context of 
electronic signatures.  First, the approach is novel as compared to existing electronic 
signature systems.  Not only does it explicitly disavow pictographic representations 
of signatures standing alone, but it also obviates the requirement for a structural 
definition of an electronic signature altogether.171  Instead PID puts its emphasis on 
the signatory rather than the signature by requiring that PID be demonstrated at each 
point where a signatory performs an act of professional responsibility in various 
pharmacy transactions.172  In doing so, the definition incorporates the signatory’s 
identity, authentication, consent, and intent into each transaction that requires some 
accountability. 
This implementation has the benefit of being usable in a complex, multi-user 
environment where a single computer terminal may be used by multiple people in a 
short time frame.  This is the closest and most realistic electronic analogy to a paper 
                                                                
166Id. at ¶2. 
167Id. 
168See id. at ¶3.  Item (4) of the paragraph states: 
[An observer], may or may not, see a signature on a prescription sent to a pharmacy by 
a prescriber using an electronic prescription transmission system.  Electronic 
signatures are not recognized as a means of ‘positive identification’ and therefore are 
not required.  If a signature is present, the prescription must indicate that the signature 
was computer-generated. 
169See § 4729-5-01(N)(5). 
170See EPTS, supra note 165.  Item 1 under ¶3 states prohibits the use of electronic 
prescriptions for Schedule II controlled substances.  Also, only a few systems have been 
approved under this process, as listed in ¶4. 
171Compare OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-01(N) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 3701.75(A)(2) discussed in supra section V.A.  
172See § 4729-5-28(A)(9), § 4729-5-28(B)(5), § 4729-5-28(C)(1), § 4729-5-28(E)(3), 
§ 4729-5-28(I)(10). 
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signature, where a signatory can affix her signature or initials where and when 
necessary, on a single document regardless of its physical custodian.  Likewise here, 
each signatory, whose PID contains the four essential elements of an electronic 
signature discussed in section V, can electronically sign at various points within a 
computer session, independent of the owner logged on to the terminal. 
Second, the novelty of the approach is ironically its own barrier to portability as 
compared to PKI.  Notably, Ohio is the only state where a state agency has 
promulgated such a standard.173  Electronic pharmacy transactions from all other 
states will therefore not meet the requirements of this law and will have to revert to 
traditional paper processes.  Even if the implementation is adopted by other states, 
there remains the technical challenge of integrating this scheme with more 
conventional electronic signature approach in current systems which uses separate 
logical points for authentication (at the beginning of a session, logon, and so on) and 
the signature (at the time of action by a signatory, the click of a mouse, a key, and so 
on).  This latter approach fundamentally relies on some a method to identify the 
signatory (authentication), and separate, logical and structured information to attach 
to the transaction (electronic signature).   
The conventional approach which has been varyingly embraced is neither easy 
nor efficient to discard.  However, for compliance with OSPB’s provisions, existing 
systems may need only minor modifications to introduce the element of 
authentication at various action points.  It can therefore be argued that a structural 
definition of an electronic signature, although not required, is nonetheless not 
prohibited by OSPB.  It can be further argued that the act of placing a signature on a 
transaction can be documented by the use of a structurally defined signature, since 
the latter can be attached to the transaction itself.  It would therefore supplement the 
need for using the paper recording of all PIDs used for validation in the OSPB 
approach.174  Ultimately, to ensure use of electronic signatures across the 
conventional systems, while accommodating OPSB’s PID requirements, a definition 
of a structural electronic signature should be retained in any proposed standard. 
C.  Federal Regulations, Federal Information Policy, & Federal Agency Efforts 
At the federal level, in addition to the Federal E-Sign Law, there are other 
instances of regulation and agency practice that have attempted to create electronic 
signature standards.  While these are somewhat fragmented, they nevertheless shed 
some light on current thoughts on future national technology policy with respect to 
electronic signatures in healthcare and other areas of commerce. 
The Federal Paperwork Reduction Act was enacted in 1995.175  The Federal 
Information Policy was accordingly revised to include aspects of electronic data 
                                                                
173See, e.g., Analysis of State Pharmacy Regulations Regarding ADS, Attachment 1: State-
by-State Overview of Automated Dispensing at 23, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CONSULTANT 
PHARMACISTS (2001), at http://www.ascp.com/public/ga/2001/pdfs/st_auto.pdf.  The authors 
compile lists of states with respect to Automated Dispensing System (ADS) laws.  Ohio is the 
only state that requires PID.  
174See § 4729-5-01(N)(5). 
175See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.A § 101 (West 2004). 
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management.176  Indirectly the act favors PKI as the standard for electronic 
signatures by stipulating appropriation of necessary funding to the General Services 
Administration office to “ensure the development and operation of a Federal bridge 
certification authority for digital signature compatibility, and for other activities 
consistent with this section . . . .”177 (emphasis added) 
Similar trends are also evident in the policies of the department of Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”).178  Following the Federal E-Sign Law stipulations, the 
FDA defines the electronic signature generally as “a computer data compilation of 
any symbol or series of symbols executed, adopted, or authorized by an individual to 
be the legally binding equivalent of the individual's handwritten signature.”179  This 
regulation also goes into significant details of implementation: it inherently favors 
biometric methods of authentication, and explicitly allows two-factor systems in the 
alternative;180 it requires that components include identity, consent, and intent;181 it 
also requires use of encryption and signature standards to ensure the integrity and 
security of the signature in both open and closed systems.182
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has also been 
involved in the standardization efforts for electronic signatures.183  Recently the 
NIST claims to have taken “a leadership role in the development of a Federal Public 
Key Infrastructure that supports digital signatures and other public key-enabled 
security services” by “coordinating with industry and technical groups developing 
PKI technology to foster interoperability of PKI products and projects” through the 
NIST Computer Security Resource Center (“CSRC”).184  Specifically, CSRC has 
created a Digital Signature Guidance document for a PKI for use by federal 
agencies.185  Strongly emphasizing broad use of PKI, the guidance indicates that “the 
same PKI over time will serve increasingly large numbers of customers, with 
capabilities such as encryption.  Consequently, up-front development costs of the 
PKI may be evaluated as something to be incurred over time (like maintenance costs) 
and in the context of a total service delivery program.”186   
                                                                
176See Purposes, 44 U.S.C.A § 3501. 
177§ 3501.203(d). 
178See Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures, 21 C.F.R § 11 (West 2004). 
179§ 11.3(b)(7). 
180§ 11.200(a). 
181§ 11.50(b). 
182§§ 11.10, 11.30. 
183See NIST's Role in Electronic Commerce, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 
TECHNOLOGY (2000), at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/ecommerce.htm.  
184See NIST PKI Program, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY CSRC 
(2001), at http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/.  
185Kathy Lyons-Burke, NIST Special Publication 800-25: Federal Agency Use of Public 
Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY CSRC (2001). 
186Id. at 22. 
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Other departments of the United States government have also released similar 
documents following the NIST guidelines.187  But whereas the NIST initiative has 
significantly aided broad use of electronic signature standards in the federal 
agencies, its scope is limited to those agencies that have adopted such operational 
practices.  They do not extend to the operations of non-federal entities and certainly 
do not enter state jurisdictions.  Neither do they apply to the context of healthcare 
which can comprise of both governmental and private entities. 
VII.  NON-REGULATORY EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION 
Aside from federal and state policy goals, there are other significant non-
regulatory reasons why electronic signatures in healthcare need standardization.  
Outside the area of rules and regulations there have been other initiatives both in 
healthcare and elsewhere, that at their core depend on the portability of authorized 
transactions.  These activities range from national efforts by federal agencies and 
committees, state health oversight boards, and the private sector.188  Without a 
portable standard for electronic signatures these activities and initiatives continue to 
face an uncertain legal future. 
A.  The US Dept. of Health And Human Services: The National Health  
Information Infrastructure (NHII) Initiative 
According to HHS, NHII is “the set of technologies, standards, applications, 
systems, values, and laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and 
public health.”189  It is therefore: 
 an initiative set forth to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and 
overall quality of health and health care in the United States  
 a comprehensive knowledge-based network of interoperable systems 
of clinical, public health, and personal health information that would 
improve decision-making by making health information available when 
and where it is needed  
 the set of technologies, standards, applications, systems, values, and 
laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and public 
health  
 voluntary 
                                                                
187See NIST PKI Program, supra note 184 (citing similar documents from The National 
Archives and Records Administration,  the Department of Treasury and the Department of 
Justice). 
188This note will focus on federal efforts to highlight healthcare transactions that cross 
state boundaries, which is where the portability of signature standards becomes particularly 
relevant. 
189See FAQs about NHII: What is NHII?, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS., (2001), 
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#What. 
2003-04] ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN E-HEALTHCARE 123 
 NOT a centralized database of medical records or a government 
regulation.190
More specifically, it cites lack of standards as one of four barriers to the 
infrastructure.191  HHS also acknowledges the importance of its role in national effort 
“in helping to adopt standards for communication and interoperability between 
systems.”192
In an interim report, the NHII workgroup of the National Committee on Vital and 
Health Statistics (“NCVHS”) emphasized the importance of standards and 
interoperability as follows: 
If information in multiple locations is to be searched, shared, and 
synthesized when needed, we will need agreed-upon . . . gate-keeping 
systems…. We will also need reliable and valid data collection methods; 
common vocabularies for personal, clinical and public health information; 
compatible systems to manage, transmit and protect the confidentiality of 
information; and standards for interoperability.193 (emphasis added) 
Of course, for the reasons discussed in section III, interoperability and transmission 
of confidential and individually identifiable health information will be obstructed if 
the consents and authorizations to such use, and the attendant disclosures, are not 
standardized and understood by the various systems involved in the transaction. 
The gateway systems referred to in the report would be unable to process 
interstate healthcare transactions as envisioned by the NHII.194  Assume that a patient 
who ordinarily lives and receives health care in Atlanta, Georgia and who is 
diagnosed with cardiac myopathy is flown in to Cleveland, Ohio, for a heart-
transplant.  Further assume that the patient has electronically signed appropriate 
informed consent and waiver documents.  Finally, assume also that the donor is a 
deceased patient from Louisville, Kentucky, whose family or estate has provided 
similar consent to his primary care provider in accordance with provisions of his 
will.  Both sets of consents, along with pertinent clinical and medical history of both 
patient and donor would have to electronically arrive at Cleveland prior to the 
surgery, and distributed to all the relevant hospital staff and only the relevant staff.195
                                                                
190Id. 
191Id. at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#Barriers.  
192Id. at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/FAQ.html#HHS.  See generally A Strategy For 
Building The National Health Information Infrastructure, Report and Recommendations From 
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics Washington, D.C. (November 15, 
2001), [hereinafter NHII Strategy], at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/reptrecs.htm. 
193See Interim Report: Toward a National Health Information Infrastructure § 2, NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
NHII2kReport.htm. (2000). 
194See id. § 5, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHII2kReport.htm#infrastructure.  
195See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d) (stipulating minimum necessary disclosure of 
protected health information). 
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The availability of the transactions involved here are not the technological 
challenge.  However, the transactions could not be meaningfully utilized if they were 
not transmitted with reliable and interoperable indications of the patient’s identity, 
intent, and consent.196  Additionally, there would have to be utmost assurance that (a) 
the transacting hospital entities were indeed who they are, and (b) that the 
information whose accuracy is critical to the life of the patient, had not been 
tampered with or altered, either inadvertently or intentionally, during transit.   
Finally, the technology implemented for such assurances of authentication and 
integration would have to be understood by the disparate systems at the various 
facilities in three states.  This is only possible if the systems followed a single 
standard. 
B.  Recommendations of the NCVHS: The Need for a Federally Mandated Electronic 
Signature Standard in National Healthcare 
In its report, the NCVHS also lists the perceived obstacles between the current 
state of affairs and the desired future.197  They include consumer and industry 
attitudes and practices in healthcare: 
Health care professionals will need to reach consensus on and accept the 
contribution of practice guidelines and other knowledge management 
tools. Public health will need to include in its toolkit integrated data 
systems; high-quality community-level data; tools to identify significant 
health trends in real-time data streams; and geographic information 
systems. Consumers and patients must have confidence the NHII will 
deliver real benefits. They will need to feel comfortable that an 
appropriate balance is being struck between their desire to safeguard 
personal health information and health professionals' need for de-
personalized information to protect public health, conduct medical 
research, and improve health care quality.198 (emphasis added) 
The “toolkits” can only be developed if the efforts are based on a standard in which 
the public can have some confidence.  This, perhaps more than any other element of 
healthcare practice, supports the need for a federally regulated and mandated 
standard as proposed here. 
There are a few lessons to be learned from the promulgation of the 
Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA.199  A study in the 1980s on 
costs in healthcare found that a staggering proportion of federal dollars spent on 
healthcare was expended in recovering the cost of healthcare itself.200  It was 
estimated that “almost one-fourth of total health care spending [in 1987]” was 
                                                                
196See id. § 2, at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHII2kReport.htm#stands.  
197Id. 
198See id. § Attitudes and Practices. 
19945 C.F.R §§ 160, 162 (West 2004). 
200See Goodman, John C. and Musgrave, Gerald L., Patient Power (Cato Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 1992), excerpt at http://www.ncpa.org/w/w53.html. 
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expended in administrative costs.201  The study attributed this cost to hospitals 
spending an enormous amount of time on paperwork for both financial exchange and 
determination of proper and necessary care.202  In November 1991, Secretary of 
HHS, Dr. Louis Sullivan, convened a forum of national health care leaders to discuss 
the challenges of reducing administrative costs; the forum subsequently formed a 
voluntary, public-private task force called the Workgroup for Electronic Data 
Interchange (“WEDI”).203
The findings of WEDI were less than flattering.  According to WEDI, 
improvement to healthcare costs could be realized only if the healthcare industry 
adopted the X12 EDI transactions.204  It also recommended that the requirements be 
federally mandated.205  Based on their recommendations the original EDI provisions 
of HIPAA Administrative Simplification were drafted.  Although the final rules 
include privacy and security provisions for health information,206 the very existence 
of these recommendations and ensuing regulations reflect, and even suggest, the 
health industry’s reticence to technical self-regulation or standardization.207
C.  The Private Sector: Federated Identity Management 
Previous sections have highlighted access control and signatory authentication 
for electronic signatures.208  The absence of consistent standards for authentication 
has led to certain private sector initiatives, the most recent (and perhaps the most 
prominent) of which is federated identity (“FID”) management.209  David F. Carr 
describes FID as a form personal of identification; individuals can use the same FID 
to sign on to different systems belonging to multiple enterprises to conduct 
transactions.210  Although similar to PKI certificates, FIDs are unique because they 
use a cooperative system of trust where partners offer FIDs to their clients and 
customers, “depend on each other to authenticate their respective users,” and “vouch 
for their access to services.”211 (emphasis added)   This would allow a physician with 
                                                                
201Id. 
202Id. 
203See Executive Summary, The 1993 WEDI Report § i (October 1993).  WEDI is located 
at http://www.wedi.org. The full report, [hereinafter WEDI Report], is located at 
http://www.wedi.org/public/articles/full1993report.doc.   
204Id. 
205Id. at 1-1.  Appendix 1: Standards Implementation and Uniform Data Content at ¶1 
makes the following recommendation: “Mandate, by federal law, that all health care 
participants use ASC X12 standards.” 
206See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (West 2004). 
207See WEDI Report, supra note 203 at § ii (Executive Summary). 
208See supra sections IV.B, at 11; V.D, at 18.  
209See David F. Carr, Primer: Federated Identity Management, BASELINE, November 3, 
2003, at http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,3959,1373941,00.asp.  
210Id. 
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a FID from her own facility, who refers a patient to another facility, to update an 
internal record of on the latter facility's data network, while using her own facility 
issued FID.  To enable this, the two facilities would have to be trusted and 
cooperative partners in a FID agreement. 
Companies internally use various protocols to recognize their users’ identities.  
Maintaining the identities of all employees of all partners in the various systems 
would be a prohibitively cumbersome task.  To overcome this, FIDs utilize 
communications protocols such as the Security Assertion Markup Language 
(“SAML”) to share information contained in FIDs, across computerized applications 
and systems.  Hence, a company keeps only its own directories and FIDs; it securely 
exchanges FID information from it with those of its partners and vice versa without 
needing to adopt the same technologies for the disparate authentication services of its 
partners.212  The principle proponents of the emerging SAML standard are the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (“OASIS”) 
and the Liberty Alliance Project (“Liberty”).213  Liberty, an industry group formed 
under the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) to promote FID 
standards, adopted SAML version 1.1 as part of its application framework.214  Early 
adopters of FID include American Express, Boeing, General Motors and Nokia.215  
FID management is an attractive alternative to managed PKI, but the case studies of 
the early adopters highlight the challenges that would face healthcare were it to 
become an adopter to the standard.216   These challenges are both logistic as well as 
legal.   
Logistically, a single healthcare system can provide multiple types of specialized 
care at multiple locations.217  In a 2001 article, Nicholas P. Terry notes that “a 
patient's [health information] likely will be spread across many systems and various 
[computerized patient records (“CPRs”)].”  Referring to CPRs as the location for 
maintaining longitudinal health records to improve healthcare quality, Terry notes 
that “some of a patient's medical records will be in discrete unregulated systems,” so 
that his discussion uses the “somewhat inaccurate singular form for CPR, including 
                                                                
212Id. 
213OASIS is located at http://www.oasis-open.org/home/index.php; Liberty is located at 
http://www.projectliberty.org/.  
214See David F. Carr, supra note 209.  For a layout of Liberty’s proposed specifications 
using this standard, see Liberty Alliance Project Phase 2 Specifications (The Liberty Alliance 
2003), at http://www.projectliberty.org/specs/index.html.  
215Id. 
216For an excellent overview of case studies of the early adopters of FID see Dan Blum, 
Federated Identity: Early Adopters Case Studies and Lessons Learned at 10 (The Burton 
Group, September 2, 2003), at http://www.burtongroup.com/guests/content/report/liberty 
alliance1.asp (website requires free registration to access this complementary content; also on 
file with the Journal of Law & Health). 
217See, e.g., The MetroHealth System located at http://www.metrohealth.org.  The system 
directory page, located at http://www.metrohealth.org/general/directory/directory.asp, lists 
various types of services provided. 
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within that concept multiple, but interoperable and interlinked CPRs.”218 (emphasis 
added)  The challenge exists because realization of the goals of FID would initially 
require standardizing authentication and access control in various systems within a 
healthcare organization in compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule.219  Even 
beyond this, maintenance of uniform longitudinal health records in disparate systems 
would be difficult at best if such maintenance were dependant on cooperative 
technology efforts and resources of diverse participants ranging from single 
practitioner offices to a large multi-site healthcare systems and insurance companies.  
HIPAA itself acknowledges these variations in both statutory definitions as well as 
comments in the preamble.220
Legally, FID’s requirement of trusted partners may raise concerns of liability and 
indemnity.  Analyst Carol Coye Benson points out that the liability has to do with the 
quality of the identity itself.221  In essence, because one healthcare organization 
would have to trust FIDs provided by another, the liability would arise from doubts 
regarding the integrity of and the ability to repudiate the identity information.  This 
trust is relevant in the context of our discussion of signatory authentication in section 
V.D.222  Assume that hospital A grants its employees FIDs and each FID contains the 
birth date and social security number for verification.  This practice may be 
unacceptable to insurance company B whose FIDs additionally record the signatory’s 
telephone number, mother’s maiden name, and city of birth.  B might argue that its 
practice yields higher quality FIDs (i.e. less susceptible to fraudulent use).  B may 
well require A, to either implement stronger FIDs or indemnify B from any harm 
resulting from fraudulent use of A’s FIDs.  Although Benson’s ultimate conclusion 
that “large-scale identity federations will all operate with explicit disavowals of 
liability” is perhaps somewhat unrealistic, it nevertheless identifies the problem.223  It 
would appear that there is no legal standard or precedent addressing the quality of 
the FID.  Furthermore, in a cooperative environment the formulation of a standard 
would be extremely difficult given the individual investments made by various 
healthcare institutions in their diverse authentication systems.  
Ultimately, the establishment of any standard to ensure quality authentication is 
likely to fall on third party professional identity providers such as CAs.224  Many 
CAs currently provide some assumptions of liability with regards to the use of their 
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PKI certificates.225  In healthcare, under the HIPAA Security Rule, liability 
protection and indemnification language may be considered a statutory requirement 
in agreements with business associates.226  Based on these considerations, FIDs may 
not provide legally reliable and predictable signatory authentication for the purpose 
of electronic signatures as compared to PKI. 
VIII.  THE IRONY: THE REAL SCENARIO OF PORTABLE HEALTHCARE 
In light of current circumstances, my imaginary encounter at UAMC system 
would likely be less than the utopian picture painted in section I.  Instead, I would 
have to enter the hospital as an emergency department (“ED”) patient, rather than a 
referral patient, since this would be the most expedient way to get care without an 
appointment.  Much waiting and signing of several pieces of paper would be 
followed by more waiting before contact with a PSR.  After all, in a trauma facility, 
my influenza or even suspected pneumonia would be less critical than gunshot 
wounds.   
It would be almost two hours later that the PSR would have finally obtained my 
relevant pharmaceutical history by interviewing me (although this information 
already exists in my electronic record in Cleveland).  It would be 10:00 PM before 
the attending physician would finally receive a faxed copy of my records from 
Cleveland, because the first transmission of my authorization would be lost in transit, 
sent to a fax number incorrectly entered by an orderly in the frenzy of ED activities.  
The physician would then formalize his decision to admit me for observation, with 
his staff faxing off a Notice of Admission to MMO.  The facility would then go 
about the laborious process of preauthorizing my treatment and observation stay 
through a combination of phone calls and fax transmissions.  I would have signed 
several more paper authorizations and disclaimers.  In the flurry of papers, my copy 
of the NPP would be lost. 
I would finally be in my assigned bed for the night.  I would be immersed in a 
pamphlet with instructions about resolving billing and insurance processes awaiting 
my return to Cleveland.  With dawn only a few hours away, I would be oblivious to 
the snow falling outside.  Blow Fly would have to wait. 
IX.  PROPOSAL: FINAL HIPAA ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE RULES -  
A HEALTHCARE PKI  
One observation that can be made from the preceding sections is that availability 
technology is not the barrier for portability of electronic signatures.  If anything, 
there are too many choices of technology.  Neither is availability of model standards 
the problem.  Indeed, the main problem is the lack of a single adopted technology 
standard.   
A second observation is that a reasonable scheme already exists in the proposed 
HIPAA electronic signature rule.227  The scheme addresses the basic requirements of 
                                                                
225See, e.g., Secure Payments: Buyer Authentication (VeriSign, Inc. ©1995-2004), at 
http://www.verisign.com/products/payflow/fraud/protection/buyerauth.html (describing 
integrated liability protection from Visa® and MasterCard®).   
226See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b)(1), 164.314(a)(1). 
227See 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241 (1998). 
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identity, authentication, consent, integrity and security as they uniquely apply to 
healthcare providers, payers and clearinghouses.228  Improving on the existing 
proposed rule can thus create a workable proposal, and is arguably the most logical 
approach to a national electronic signature standard for healthcare. 
A.  A Final Electronic Signature Rule Under HIPAA – Modifications 
 to the Proposed Rule 
The central thrust of this proposal is to set up a trust infrastructure for E-health 
under the proposed electronic signature rule of HIPAA.229  It is also recommended 
that all technical specifications and standards under the rule be developed or adopted 
jointly by NIST and ANSI and maintained by them as the designated standards 
maintenance organizations (“DSMO”).230  To this end, the following refinements to 
the existing proposed rule are added: 
1.  Identity 
The Federal E-Sign Law is testimony to the realization that the only feasible 
solution for identity management in e-commerce is a PKI.  The HIPAA provisions 
should accordingly incorporate this requirement in the form of a healthcare PKI.  
The key or certificate management standard should follow the NIST recommended 
X.509 version 3 public and private keys, further adapted to include identity roles in 
healthcare transactions.231  The specifications should be adopted and maintained by 
HHS as formal regulatory standards.232  Finally, a division of HHS should become 
the designated CA, either directly, or through delegation to another DSMO, for all 
PKI certificates assigned for healthcare operations.233
2.  Authentication 
Typical biometric systems used for authentication for the purpose of access 
control may not be the most efficient technology for authentication of a signatory’s 
identity for reasons identified earlier.234  For the typical healthcare consumer, this 
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230See Health Insurance Reform: Announcement of Designated Standard Maintenance 
Organizations, 65 FED. REG. 50373 (August 17, 2000), [hereinafter HIPAA DSMOs], where 
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could represent unacceptable delays in healthcare should such systems malfunction.  
It is useful to note that more sophisticated biometric systems are available that can 
virtually eliminate false rejections.235  However commercial application of such 
systems in healthcare has two drawbacks: (a) they are usually not cost-effective 
solutions, and (b) they often use proprietary or patented techniques, with the 
associated problems discussed in section IV.A.  Accordingly, digital signature 
capture solutions that capture signature metrics are favored over biometric solutions 
in this proposal.236  This technique offers the benefits of biometrics while retaining a 
pictographic symbol familiar in printed output.  The standard should specify the 
minimum metrics to be captured in digital signature capture systems to ensure 
portability of authentication.  Appropriate metrics templates should be incorporated 
into the modified X.509 key standard for signatures thus captured.237
Two-factor authentication can also be used as an alternative method, with a 
digital signature code unique to the user to be attached to each transaction.238  It is 
noted that when sufficiently developed, the emerging SSL/UA standard can be 
incorporated into this standard with its attendant benefits of easy distribution and low 
cost.239  It is useful to reiterate that authentication here is narrowly tailored for use in 
electronic signatures.240  For the purpose of general workforce access control, either 
conventional biometrics or two-factor authentication remain the principal choice.  
Specifically, where a member of the workforce is also a patient, the use of both 
methods is not precluded in the scheme proposed here.   
3.  Intent And Consent 
Standard consent language fields should become a part of the transaction content 
for all healthcare transactions.  Logical manifestation indicating intent and 
understanding of the transaction content is more complex, and should be formalized 
                                                                
235See, e.g., Ultra-Scan® Corporation, located at http://www.ultra-scan.com/.  Ultra-Scan 
offers high-accuracy ultrasonic fingerprint identification technology based on patented 
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for an ultrasound imaging method for human tissue surface, where “[t]he quality of the images 
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technology since the ultrasonic images are less dependent on the surface condition of the 
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236See Benjamin Wright, Eggs In Baskets: Distributing The Risks Of Electronic 
Signatures, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 189, 195 (§ 5 describes a pen biometrics 
technology that captures signatures made on a digital pad, and measures “size, shape, and 
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TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at Technology 11 (discussing possible mechanisms to secure e-commerce 
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239See Rainbow Two-Factor, supra note 135, at The Next Wave of User Authentication – 
SSL User Authentication. 
240See supra section V.D. 
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in the standard as a mechanism of recording a series of actions such as key-strokes 
(e.g. the Page Down key) indicating that the signatory has viewed all the appropriate 
screens by paging through them before signing. 
4.  Integrity And Security 
PKI ensures the integrity and security of transactions because it allows the 
incorporation of encryption and integrity check schemes into the various stages of 
the transaction creation, transmission, receipt, and acknowledgment sequence.241  
The only remaining stipulation required here is the use of a standard encryption 
scheme.  Owing to the rapid development and improvement in encryption ciphers 
and their relative strengths, this area of the standard could be stipulated as a set of 
minimum requirements.  However, in the interest of ensuring portability, a better 
proposition would have requirements specified and adopted by the DSMOs as part of 
the PKI, to be updated as needed by proposed HHS rule-making from time to time.  
This will further ensure that the technical maturity of the standard remains flexible to 
the underlying legislative processes. 
B.  Benefits of Electronic Signature Regulations Under HIPAA:  The Role of the 
Federal Government in Healthcare as a National Enterprise 
The benefits of the proposed standard are numerous.  First, the proposal calls for 
a modification of existing proposed rules under HIPAA.  New congressional 
lawmaking will not be required; instead refinement and furtherance of existing 
agency regulations will suffice.  Legislative and judicial challenges of new 
congressional lawmaking thus will be avoided.  Additionally, HHS will have the 
benefit of experience gained from the ongoing implementation of the Transactions 
and Code Sets rules of HIPAA in the area of patient financial transactions.242
Second, HIPAA includes a broad grant of authority from Congress to HHS as to 
the regulation of medical information: 
If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information transmitted in connection with 
the transactions described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act (as 
added by Section 262) is not enacted by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services shall promulgate final regulations 
containing such standards. . . . 243  
HIPAA also includes provisions that address the issue of non-preemption of state 
laws by clarifying that “[a] regulation promulgated under [the rule] shall not 
supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes 
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent 
than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the 
regulation.”244  Since the UETA is modeled after the Federal E-Sign Law, and this 
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proposal draws on the latter, non-preemption should not be a problem in states that 
have only enacted the UETA.  However for those states where disparate electronic 
signature statutes exist specifically for healthcare, the proposed standard should 
prevail; more stringent state technical standards may nevertheless be incompatible 
with this standard in the realm of portability.  Therefore, minimally the preemption 
clause should apply to invalidate any state statute whose implementation would be 
contrary to the technical standards developed under this proposal. 
Third, Congress’s legislative authority under HIPAA has successfully passed 
judicial scrutiny.  In South Carolina Med. Ass’n v. Thompson, the appellants 
challenged HIPAA on grounds of impermissible Congressional authority and sought 
to have several provisions of the HIPAA declared unconstitutional.245  The fourth 
circuit rejected the argument because “Congress laid out an intelligible principle in 
HIPAA to guide agency action . . . .”246  The court found the promulgation of the 
regulations to be “a necessary cooperation between coordinate branches” rather than 
a constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative authority.247  In particular 
the court pointed out that the regulations focused on “enabling electronic portability, 
not simply on regulating purely electronic activity.”248 (emphasis added) 
Similarly, in Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. Of Health 
and Human Services, the petitioners challenged the authority of HHS under HIPAA 
claiming that it violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.249  
However, that court also rejected the complaint because “HIPAA regulates interstate 
economic activity” and “[h]ealth care providers transmitting health information in 
electronic form in connection with health claims, referral authorizations, and health 
care payments, also engage in interstate commerce.”250  It thus concluded that 
HIPAA fell within Congress's authority under the Commerce power.251
Finally, in the NHII reality healthcare effectively ceases to be a local or state 
owned process.  Instead it becomes a national industry that facilitates the delivery of 
healthcare seamlessly and uniformly across state borders.  In this context, conflicting 
standards that impede the flow of healthcare transactions across state borders would 
be contrary to national healthcare policy.  Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that 
if NHII becomes the de facto standard for electronic healthcare, any state electronic 
signature law for healthcare that contradicts the infrastructure’s intended portability 
also effectively “burdens interstate migration and thus violates the [signatory’s 
constitutional] right to travel.”252
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C.  Implementation, Non-Compliance, and Sanctions: Some Final Thoughts 
It would be prudent to note that NCVHS’s final report on the NHII253 is followed 
closely in time by its formal recommendations for the Patient Medical Records 
Information (“PMRI”) standards.254  Specifically, PMRI Recommendation, made 
pursuant to a provision in HIPAA,255 stipulates Health Level Seven as the current 
standard for clinical transactions such as order entry, scheduling, medical 
record/image management, patient administration, observation reporting, financial 
management, and patient care.256  This is the last significant piece of the electronic 
healthcare puzzle.  While the standard transaction provisions under HIPAA address 
the financial and billing transactions for healthcare, PMRI Recommendations would 
cover clinical transactions.257  This is arguably the best opportunity the health 
industry has had to effectuate true portability of a standardized healthcare transaction 
– an effort that at its forefront must include the electronic signature issues for reasons 
previously discussed. 
One might also note that state signature statutes rarely contain explicit sanctions 
for violations; as seen earlier, disputes involving non-compliance have had to resort 
to the common law.258  In contrast, HIPAA stipulates civil and monetary penalties for 
violations of the HHS rules.259  Additionally, HHS can bring to bear the enormous 
financial weight of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs as healthcare payers 
in order to encourage compliance.  The sanction provisions, combined with this 
financial clout, would make a modified final HIPAA electronic signature statute, 
under the authority of HHS, the ideal approach to achieving the vision of NHII. 
X.  CONCLUSIONS 
NHII’s vision of an integrated health information infrastructure can provide a 
truly seemless healthcare environment for today’s patient.  Information can freely 
flow between entities across state borders.  The vision is fundamentally dependant on 
various functions of the traditional signature in the healthcare context.  Such 
functions are a product of both the common law as well as legislative efforts at state 
and federal levels.  To bring healthcare into the electronic information age, one must 
migrate healthcare information management from paper processes to electronic 
records.  An integral and vital part of this migration is the formulation of an 
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electronic signature that is uniform and portable.  Portability will assure that the legal 
requirements of signatures – identity, authentication, consent and intent, and integrity 
and security – become a part of each healthcare transaction.   
The ultimate realization of NHII will necessitate creating a healthcare PKI.  A 
PKI will inherently provide non-repudiated authentication of the signatory’s identity, 
consent, and intent.  It will also ensure integrity and security of the transaction 
content through encryption.  Current regulatory efforts at standardization through 
state statutes, federal regulations, federal information policy, and federal and state 
agency rules have produced inconsistent results.  But these efforts point to the need 
for a healthcare PKI.  This position is also supported by non-regulatory efforts and 
initiatives both at the federal level as well as in the private sector.  The absence of a 
uniform standard destroys the utopia of the NHII with the frustrations of non-
portability.   
Accordingly, a federally mandated uniform statutory scheme would be ideal 
under a final modified version of the pending HIPAA electronic signature rule.  It 
would create a national healthcare PKI, and address all aspects of electronic 
signatures - identity, authentication, consent and intent, and integrity and security.  
Such a rule would benefit from the federal government’s role in national healthcare 
and its prior experience with implementation of other HIPAA provisions.  The 
federal government’s authority to create such rules through HHS has already been 
endorsed by the judiciary.  Finally, the civil and monetary penalties of non-
compliance under HIPAA, as well as HHS’s financial weight as a payer in the 
healthcare industry, would ensure satisfactory compliance with the rule’s standards.  
NHII could indeed be the reality of future national healthcare. 
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